Orbital Flat Surface

§§


I have several questions.


Spinoza seems to have used the aristoteles' & scholastics' grammar
of substance mode attribute


it seems from what i read last week in atp

that the two phases dg talk about the diagram

match up well

with
1-) semiotic intellect active : tensors, function
2-) physicall res extensa passive : extension , matter

the 1 & 2 two known attributes of res extensa et res cognitio in Ethics Spinozae


an adequate idea is one which is in the singular mind according as the continuity between the active mind and the passive res extensa,
as it is in god or substance


besides the connexion of things in res extensa are the same as the connexion of things in cognition

(are these based on correct assumption though?)


what to we understand by "passive" or "active" ?

that the passive thing cannot be understood lest is provided the concept of the active thing

so that religion is tied to becoming active of the singular mind


(if god is the only thing active and its accidents its active affections the modes,
so that the purpose of life in Ethics, is to become free, to be the model of free man,
and this means for the parts of the minds, the affections to "return" to god, so as
to "activate" them, to become "mode": an expression of god, and that is why deleuze talks about
becoming expressive. deleuze does his system as if only the accidents were "saying" the univocity
and the god did not exist, and that's why he agrees to an ambivalency whence true and false at once mean the same thing
and which is just as waffling and why he takes so much time (his whole life of philosopher)
so that his becoming expressive in courses, relations, books, "return" to
the adequate idea of himself living in a single substance > text virtual actual Paris 1995.)



so that the intellect is passive when the mind does not understand the only adequate ideas,
active, when it only works from adequate ideas, activating further reasoning.
paranoid moment: how to be sure you know what an adequate idea is the idea you currently perceives in You?

could we not further say that deleuze expression of a diagram is the expression of a passive intellect

its activity consists in the "production of reality" by the abstract machine

perhaps he meant that deleuze ought to absorb gradually god or the substance,
to open up on the "outside" ?


besides spinoza's ethics saying that the attribute is what the intellect perceives
as constituting the essence of the substance, which is unique


so the attribute "res extensa" cannot be passive, to the contrary of what i have proposed above
it does not either express "passivity" of matter for a divine active understanding
(berkley said that matter was an absurdity as a concept as there were only perceptions, so is "nothingness" according to this train of thoughts)

"res extensa" belongs to the spinozist construction of a single substance
but it cannot help the mind wanting to become active
as the latter needs to grow all its parts, all its affections and convert all passivity
into activity

which is why Isabelle Stengers when criticizing the scientific habit to get attributes & justifications by helping
humanity might be quite flat passive as an expression, expression of a dry and dull intellect in this girl


the intellectual pleasure at experimenting with understanding intellectual constructions depends upon ignorance,
the time for you to unfold the assumptions in this language,
its a passive task, a loss in your life, which is precious


better ethical path to activate anything which is passive, perhaps the becoming human about which
James William talks about Cézanne and Sciences, a becoming human which affects all parts in the Universe.

"res extensa" alone is not an adequate idea, it is not " a name", a "model " .


only names (or models) are modes, destined to grow , more and more active.

"res cognitio" alone neither is a name, an adequate idea .

an "essence" alone is not a name nor an adequate idea for that reason, it is a word in English but not a name.


what is the concept from which you start if you want to talk about "res extensa" in relation to the agents of the intellect? to this
for Spinoza was language an answer, the study of the relations between the signs, what notions could be active ingredients
when involved in signs activities as affected by humans, that was a start, so were sensations of geometry for Cézanne, or creating a robot that could see for Marvin Minsky

i guess the fragmentation of words as so many black holes sucking your growth and other people's growth
such as the pointillists concepts or words invented in atp if singled out from the whole slow slow slow evolution
towards truth of gilles deleuze, this pointillism is relevant of a lack of taste in the chosen words, such as "infinite"
(Henry Miller explains how he found ridiculous this symbol when he was a teenager at primary school, the horizontal 8 made him
laugh and he said it to everyone in the classroom and the teacher grew upset about that)


such these words: the "diagram" the "CsO" as various abstract machines on a substance, the melting attributes, is a surreal presuposition, the n-1 abstraction of the "infinite" in deleuze's system, or work of his life:
his philosophy .


and the "abstract machine" single "flesh" made of intensities, its raison d' etre, is the "traits" the dashes of function and matter,
of "activity in the mind of the creator", and the "effect of this activity as the passive dash" as a "return", not towards god,
not a return of gilles towards the substance as its raison d etre, but a return of gilles creation to the humans, a kind of oedipal thing right,
am I mistaken by my words?


instead of being just a human, gilles deleuze as a philosophy aimed at the creation of a new people, in the name of hacking a dividual humanity like "an IBM computer " (letter to Félix)
-
With no grammar,
the flight line instead is something which aims at sucking out human vital relations "like one digs a hole in a tube" .


i propose instead We to build a common grammar for the sake of human's vital relations to grow on the planet and beyond,
and humans to become modes, i mean 'affections' conscious of whence they come from, as such, and where to they are going
together, (when) each mode having a project telescopic begets upwards new affections or modes 'to come'
and forgets about the dullness the nerdy intellect faster than did deleuze & guattari .

best congrats to everybody !!

Johnatan Petterson

Johnny wrote: ' besides Spinoza's ethics saying that the attribute is what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of the substance, which is unique so the attribute "res extensa" cannot be passive....it does not either express "passivity" of matter for a divine active understanding (berkeley said....)'

Regardless of what berkeley said, we have to dissolve the signifier, 'god,' in order to see that Lacan was right in saying that Homo sapiens has always been getting it wrong. The term "god" is a worn-out substitute for the perceived world or nature, a signifier that has turned violent and sour the more that knowledge replaces faith in a non-existent entity that supposedly cares for a group or individual. This illusory "caring" began with hominid groups attempting to decipher natural phenomenon for the sake of group security: either you guessed correctly that it was a real tiger rather than the rustling of grass in the wind, or you were eaten.

We will attack precisely this concept of "divine active understanding."

'To establish the logic of radical atheism, I proceed from Derrida's notion of spacing (espacement). As he points out in his late work, On Touching, spacing is "the first word of any deconstruction, valid for space as well as time."....I seek to develop the philosophical significance of Derrida's argument by accounting for (why [italics]) spacing is irreducible, and (how [it.]) it should be understood, and (what [it.]) implications follow from thinking it as a constitutive condition....Derrida repeatedly argues that (differance [it.]) (as a name for the spacing of time) not only applies to language or experience or any other delimited region of being. Rather, it is an (absolutely general condition [it.]), which means that there cannot even in principle be anything that is exempt from temporal finitude.'
(Haegglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, p. 2)

When we exchange the signifier 'god' for more proper ones such as 'world,' 'nature' etc., we have left religious myth (as a mental disease) in the dust. There is one tentative reference to memory four this context which is may be found on the earlier D&G list, though Guattari here takes up the banner:

'It is to be expected that such taking consistency relies on collective systems for the 'putting into memory' of data and of knowledges but equally on material apparatuses of technical, scientific and aesthetic order....I am not saying that it is a matter here of material infrastructures conditioning collective subjectivity directly, but only of components essential to its taking consistency in space and time as a function ot technical, scientific and artistic transformations. These considerations led me, then, to distinguish three zones of historical fracture on the basis of which, over the last millenium, the three fundamental capitalistic components saw the light of day:'
(Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies)
to be continued

One can easily see how religion confiscated the earth for its own use against the heretic, as Guattari continues:

' 1.) The age of European Christianity, marked by a new conception of the relations between the Earth and Power 2.) the age of capitalistic deterritorialization of knowledges and techniques, founded on the principles of generalized equivalence 3.) the age of planetary computerization, which opens up the possibility that a creative and singularizing processuality might become the new basic reference.'
(Guattari, op cit, p. 6)

Johnny wrote: 'in the chosen words, such as 'infinite.' On the grammatical of all of this, we have a syntax excerpt"

'The negative infinity of time is an (infinite finitude [italics]), since it entails that finitude cannot ever be eliminated or overcome....Derrida emphasizes that even though the syntax of his argument resembles that of negative theology, it is not theological: "Not even in the order of the most negative of all negative theologies, which are always concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. Such a development is not in question here [Margins of Philosophy, p. 6).'
(Haegglund, op cit, p. 3)

Mike,

i think Johnattan was talking about
the ethics distinction between substance and accidents (modes)

(see first please ethics spinoza book I)
various definitions: + causa sui + substance, modes
+
(then see:)
prop VII
A la nature de la substance, il appartient d'exister

(transl:)
to the nature of the substance, it belongs: to exist

prop VIII scolia II
(...)
bien plus cette proposition (la proposition 7 c'est-à-dire), serait pour tous
un axiome et serait comptée parmi les notions communes.

(this proposition 7 moreover, would be for everyone an axiom
and be counted amongst common notions)

Car, par substance, ils entendraient
ce qui est en soi et est conçu par soi

c'est-à-dire ce dont la connaissance n'a pas besoin de la connaissance d'une autre chose

;

par modifications d'autre part, ce qui est en autre chose, et desquelles le concept est formé
du concept de la chose en quoi elles sont

translation in English:

" by substance they would hear
what is in It-self and is conceived by -It-self

that is what (of which) to understand, the understanding does not need the understanding of another thing

;

by modifications (=accidents) on the other side,
(they would hear)
what is in some Other thing,
and the concept(s) of these modifications
are/is created (/formed) from the concept of what they are into
(=from a concept in the substance causa sui [prop VII] "

Sylvia